We characterize a seller's optimal scheme for the sale of an indivisible good to one of n risk averse buyers. We also compare certain commonly used schemes, such as the high bid and second bid auctions, under the hypothesis of risk aversion. ). One conclusion that emerges from this work is that, for many distributions of preferences (the exceptions are discussed in Remark 8.1), the standard "high bid" and "English" auctions, modified to allow for a seller's reserve price, are equivalent (i.e., they generate the same expected revenue for the seller) and optimal. These classical auctions, however, are not equivalent from the seller's viewpoint when buyers are risk averse (see Theorem 4 below). Moreover, neither is optimal. This is for two essentially conflicting reasons: the desirability of insuring these buyers against risk, and the desirability of exploiting their risk-bearing in order to screen them.
auctions. We establish existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium in these auctions (Theorems 2 and 3) and show quite generally (Theorem 4) that when buyers are risk averse, the high bid auction generates greater expected revenue for the seller than the English auction. 3 We argue, moreover, that the seller's preference for the high bid auction is intensified if he is risk averse (Theorem 5). We also consider the "perfect insurance auction," in which buyer's marginal utilities of income are the same whether they win or lose. We show (Theorem 6) that, for an important class of cases, the English and perfect insurance auctions generate the same expected revenue for the seller. In Section 3 we take up optimal auctions and show that the seller's optimization reduces to a straightforward control problem (Theorems 8 and 9). In Section 4, we discuss the properties of optimal auctions mentioned above and also one-buyer auctions (Theorem 17). Finally, Section 5 comprises a few concluding remarks. An Appendix contains the proof of the technically complex Theorem 7.
THE MODEL
We consider the problem of a seller who wishes to maximize his expected revenue from the sale of a single item. This formulation assumes that the seller is risk neutral toward revenue. We discuss the reasons for this assumption in Section 5. The formulation also implicitly supposes that the seller himself attaches no value to the item. But the analysis would require only slight modification to accommodate a positive seller's value. The seller chooses a selling procedure, or auction, which is a game among the potential buyers, n in number (n -1). Each buyer i has a strategy space Si. On the basis of the n-tuple of strategies (sl, . .. , Sn), the auction assigns buyer i a probability of winning Hi(sl, ... , Sn) and requires him to make payment 3i(S1, ... , Sn) if he wins and payment a!i(Si, .. . , Sn) if he loses, where the tildas reflect the possibility that ,i and cai are random functions. [14] , and Riley and Samuelson [22] .
4The assumption of identical distributions is inessential; however, the independence assumption is crucial to the methods and results of this paper (see Section 5). where "E" denotes the expectation operator. We shall supppose that u(x, 0) and w(x) satisfy the following rather innocuous restrictions. 
Subscripts denote the argument with respect to which a partial derivative is taken.
It is natural to assume that utility is increasing in income; hence A2. Assumption A3 is simply a convenient normalization of preferences. Because we are interested in risk averse buyers, we assume that both u and w are concave functions of income (A4). Finally, in A5, we parameterize preferences so that increasing 0 implies greater utility (greater "eagerness" in the terminology of the introduction).
For some of the results of this paper, we shall require the following more substantive assumptions. If we equate 0 with "wealth," then Bi simply requires that marginal utility of income decline with wealth, whereas B2 stipulates that the gains from increasing wealth should be diminishing. Assumption B3 requires that if a buyer is better off losing than winning an auction, his marginal utility of income must be higher in the winning state. Assumption B4 does not have such an obvious economic 5 Our formulation in terms of u and w assumes that buyers' preferences over money are identical in the event they lose. This assumption is inessential for the results, but it somewhat simplifies the analysis. The formulation also implies that buyers' appraisals of the item are not influenced by what other buyers think. This simplification is also not crucial. For a treatment that allows for interdependence of tastes, see the predecessor of this paper, Maskin and Riley [10] . interpretation but is nonetheless satisfied by several important models, as we shall see below.
It is commonly thought to be empirically true that people become less risk averse as their well-being increases. One formulation of this "law" asserts that absolute risk aversion declines (or at least does not increase) with income. That is, (2) a -uli(x, As a final illustration, suppose that the item is of certain quality and has equivalent monetary value but also has an intensifying effect-so that higher values of 0 represent a greater ability to derive pleasure, crudely translated into a higher marginal utility of income. A simple example of such an effect is as follows. We now establish the contrapositive of B3 for Case 3 preferences; that is, 
Define 4(v, -t) U(v -t).

Then 4(v, -t) is increasing in
. U"(v -t) T(v I0) dv -U"(v -t) T(iU I0).
Thus, assuming U"' -0, T(v I0) everywhere nonnegative is again a sufficient condition.
Turning to Assumption B5 it is readily verified that for Cases 1-3 a sufficient condition is U"' ; o. 8 In Case 4 rather more stringent conditions are required to satisfy Assumption To predict the outcome of an auction, we must specify a solution concept. We shall assume that the functional forms u(*, *) and w(*) and the distribution F are common knowledge among buyers and seller but that only buyer i knows the value of the parameter Oi. In this case, the Bayesian equilibrium of Harsanyi [7] is appropriate. For this solution concept, the "revelation principle"9 (see Dasgupta 'This term is due to Myerson [20] . For an informal discussion of the application of this principle to auction design see Riley and Samuelson [22] .
'? This term is borrowed from Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin [3] .
Because the buyers are ex ante identical, we may confine our attention to symmetric auctions, i.e., those where families of Hi, ,fi, and ci functions are permutation symmetric." Define To see that it suffices to consider permutation symmetric families of Hi's, a,'s and 8i's, consider the case of two buyers. Suppose an asymmetric auction A, were optimal. By symmetry, the auction A2 obtained from A, by reversing the roles of the buyers is also optimal. But then the symmetric auction A,2 obtained by flipping a coin to decide which of the two auctions, A, or A2, to play is also optimal. The argument generalizes to more than two buyers. than the preceding one. The winner is the last buyer to bid (again, ties are broken by a randomizing device), and he pays his bid, while losers, again, pay nothing.'2 As Vickrey [25] argued, 13 the English auction is equivalent, if the Oi's are independently distributed, to a sealed bid auction in which the higher bidder wins but pays only the second highest bid, i.e., to a "second bid" auction (here we assume the continuous price formulation of footnote 12). Because it is easier to work with, we shall study the second bid formulation. Our ability to do this, however, depends crucially on independence; the two auctions are not equivalent otherwise. Indeed, as Milgrom and Weber [17] show, buyers who are either risk neutral or exhibit constant absolute risk aversion bid higher, on average, in an English auction than in a second bid auction if, roughly speaking, the Oi's are positively correlated.
We begin by showing that under some of the conditions discussed in Section 1, equilibria in high and second bid auctions exist, are unique and have the property that bids are increasing as functions of Oi. Because they are sometimes optimal when buyers are risk neutral, we shall consider high and second bid auctions with seller reserve prices, i.e., minimum permissible bids. In the second bid auction with reserve price, b?, a winning buyer pays bo if no bid other than his own is greater than bo. Because the buyers are ex ante identical, it is natural to focus attention on symmetric equilibria. In Remarks 2.3 and 3.2, we discuss the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. 12 This description of the English auction is ill-specified because rational buyers may wish to raise their bids by infinitesimals. This problem can be avoided either by postulating a minimum quantity by which bids must be raised, or by adopting the following continuous price formulation. Suppose that the seller quotes a price that rises continuously over time. At any instant, a buyer can choose either to stay in or to drop out (forever). The winner is the last buyer to remain (again, ties are broken by a randomizing device), and he pays the price prevailing at the time the penultimate buyer drops out. Losers, as usual, pay nothing. 13 But then a buyer with parameter 0* is better off bidding less than h(6*), since otherwise there is a positive probability he will pay more than his reservation price.
Next But then a buyer with parameter 6** is better off bidding more than h(6**) since otherwise there is a positive probability that he will lose to a bid less than his reservation price. Even in the case n = 2, however, there is good reason to single out the symmetric equilibrium. Besides its appeal from its very symmetry, the symmetric equilibrium is also the unique dominant strategy equilibrium. Closely related to this point is the fact that it corresponds to the unique (subgame) perfect equilibrium of the English auction (recall that our motivation for examining second bid auctions was their equivalence to English auctions). There is a one-to-one correspondence between the asymmetric equilibria of, the second bid and English auctions. However, those in the latter auction fail to be subgame perfect, whereas those in the former are not trembling-hand perfect (see Selten [24] ). For greater elaboration of these points see Maskin and Riley [13] . THEOREM 7: Suppose that G(s), the probability of winning with parameter equal to s, is piecewise diferentiable. If G(s) can be generated by a direct revelation auction, then, conditional on having a parameter value of at least y, the expected probability of winning never exceeds the expected probability that y is the highest parameter value. That is, a necessary condition for there to exist a permutation symmetric family (see footnote 11) of probability functions HjI(x), j = 1,..., n, satisfying Ej Hj 1 1, such that After applying the maximum principle to obtain necessary conditions, we show that there is a solution (G*, b*, a*) that is continuous. Using this result we obtain a condition ensuring that G* and b* are everywhere nondecreasing. Thus, under this condition, Lemma 2 and Theorem 7 together imply that (G*, b*, a*) is a solution to the seller's (deterministic) problem. To be precise, we establish the following theorem. 
(y). Then if the solution to the control problem of maximizing (38) subject to (35) and (39)-(42) satisfies (45) O~(O)~2+F"t fwl(-a(O)) (45) 0 <j(O) 2 +(F')2 J ewi(a(x))F'(x) dx
this solution corresponds to an optimum for the seller among all deterministic auctions. nondecreasing and satisfies (41), the constraint G(0)  1 -e(1 -0) is never binding. Therefore, the solution to the control problem is an optimal deterministic auction.
Q.E.D.
We mentioned in Remark 8.1 that the density condition (45) is crucial to the conclusion that G is nondecreasing in the optimal auction. It is also essential to ensuring that only the local downward constraint (35) is binding among all the incentive constraints. Violations of (45) can lead to other constraints being binding. Moore [19] drops condition (45) (but strengthens Assumption B). He explicitly introduces all the downward constraints (not just (35)) into the control problem and shows that a solution to the revised control problem automatically satisfies all the upper constraints. He then derives many of the same qualitative properties of optimal auctions that we do (excluding, of course, G' , 0) . So far in this section, we have confined our attention to deterministic auctionsones where b and d are deterministic. That this restriction is justified, assuming the hypotheses of Theorem 8, is confirmed by the following result: (-b(0), 0) +(I -G(0))w(-a(0) It is readily confirmed that if 0 = 01, the buyer opts for b, and that if 0 = 02 the buyer prefers b2. Moreover, given these choices, the scheme extracts all buyer surplus. Thus the scheme is certainly optimal. Furthermore, it is evident that no scheme where b1 is deterministic can extract all surplus. Hence randomization is essential.
Theorem 9 establishes that the first order conditions (46)-(48) are necessary for a maximum. They need not be sufficient, however, because, although the objective function is concave and the constraints (39)-(41) are convex, the incentive constraint, (35), is nonconvex. Indeed, without that nonconvexity, establishing that the optimal a and b are deterministic would be trivial and would not require any assumptions about how risk aversion changes in 0 (only that the buyer actually be risk averse); we could simply replace ac and b by their certainty equivalents.
PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL AUCTIONS
The proof of Theorem 8, in addition to demonstrating that designing an optimal auction reduces to a conceptually simple and standard control problem, establishes and suggests certain interesting properties of optimal auctions. We now present some of these properties explicitly. there is no value to buyers bearing risk. It is easy to show that for such preferences, the optimal auction entails full insurance.'9 This is to be contrasted with Theorem 6 which demonstrates that, for Case 1 preferences, a perfect insurance auction is not only suboptimal but inferior to the high bid auction. Theorem 12 is in general false when n = 1, as Matthews [15] illustrates with Case 1 preferences and constant absolute risk aversion. Intuitively, a high bidder in a multi-buyer auction must be insured against losing because there may always be a higher bidder. But in a one-buyer auction, a sufficiently high bidder will have a probability one chance of winning (see Theorem 17).
Next we consider the behavior of a, the fee a buyer pays if he loses. We observe that for low values of 0 where G is positive, a is positive and increasing, whereas a is negative for high 0's. Since, from Theorem 10, b, the buyer's "bid", is increasing in 0, we conclude that if a buyer bids low, he is penalized for losing in an optimal auction but is compensated for losing if he bids high. Q.E.D.
We next study the expected revenue generated from a given buyer. Theorem 15 has analogues in many other "monopoly" problems. In the optimal tax literature, for example, its counterpart is the property that taxes should be increasing in individuals' skill (see, e.g., Mirrlees [18] ). Theorem 15 is less obvious than many of these counterparts, however, because of the feasibility constraint (41) and because there is a two-dimensional vector of payments (b(0), a(0)) rather a single function relating 0 to a payment.
We next demonstrate that, at least for Case I preferences exhibiting nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, the seller will find it advantageous to set a positive reserve price-that is, he will refuse to sell to a buyer with a 0 less than some positive level 00. Theorems 16 and 17 and the continuity of G permit us to conclude that, at least for Case 1 preferences with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, an optimal auction divides the unit interval into three nondegenerate subintervals: the lowest interval has G =0; the middle interval has 0< G < 1; the upper interval has G = 1. The middle interval is perhaps the most interesting. We have taken G(0) to be the probability of winning. In the one buyer case we could alternatively interpret G(0) as the probability that the item does not "fall apart", i.e., the "quality" of the item. The nondegeneracy of the middle interval then implies that there are values of 0 for which the seller will offer less than top quality, even though quality is costless to provide. This result hinges crucially on risk aversion. As Riley and Zeckhauser [23] show, the optimal G equals either 0 or 1 for all values of 0 if the buyer is risk neutral.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have been most concerned in this paper with elucidating the interplay between insurance and screening considerations in models of incomplete informa-tion with risk averse agents. We have studied auctions in particular, but as they are formally very similar to a variety of other monopoly problems, the principles that emerge all apply elsewhere.
We have discussed the roles of most of our assumptions, but it is worth returning to two of them. First, by assuming that the seller maximizes expected revenue, we implicitly suppose that he is risk neutral. For the case of a single buyer this assumption makes no qualitative difference. Indeed, for this case, we could have presented Theorems 8-11 and 13-17 for a risk averse seller with only slightly modified proofs. The assumption of seller risk neutrality is, however, crucial to our methods for two or more buyers. Risk neutrality means that the seller's payoff depends on the underlying probabilities, Hi, only through the marginal distribution G. Thus we can work directly with G rather than with the analytically more difficult Hi's.
For much the same reason, the hypothesis that the Oi's are distributed independently is highly simplifying. Indeed, without independence, a buyer's marginal probability of winning depends not just on his bidding behavior but on his parameter. Thus, again, we are forced to work with the Hi functions. It is easy to see that the seller can exploit any correlation among the Oi's. To take an extreme example, suppose that the value of Oi were the same for all buyers. Even if the seller did not know this value, he could extract all surplus from buyers by operating a second bid auction.
As 
